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Who Bears the Balloon Risk in
Commercial MBS? In some cases it
can be investment-grade tranches.

Mark J. Eppli
Bell Real Estate Chair, Department of Finance
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Charles C. Tu
Burnham-Moores Center for Real Estate, University of San Diego
San Diego. CA

Global capitalization of commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) today exceeds $500 billion, and CMBS have been included in
several fixed-income indexes in the past several years. As the CMBS
market continues to grow, understanding the risk characteristics of
these investments becomes more important to a broader market of
investors.
To date, much of the research on commercial mortgages and
CMBS has focused on the impact of default during the term of the loan
(i.e., term default), and has paid little attention to balloon or extension
risk. Lehman, Freydberg, and Tcherkassova note about balloon risk for
2004 vintage CMBS investments:
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While we admit we are at a loss for forecasting future
extensions we think that investors, particularly those managing
buy and hold portfolios, should at least consider the potential
implications of loan extensions when determining relative value
[2004, p. 2] (emphasis in original).
The newness of the CMBS market and the changing attributes of
CMBS mortgage pools make it difficult for researchers to address the
issue of balloon risk empirically. First, to date few CMBS investments
have gone through a complete ten-year hold-to-maturity investment
cycle, and none has experienced an investment cycle in an increasing
interest rate environment, thus greatly limiting the data available to
test the impact of balloon risk on CMBS investments.
Second, CMBS pools that have matured have different
characteristics from more recent pools. For example, the average
CMBS pool size for the 1987-1995 CMBS issuances was $144.0 million,
different from the $1.1 billion average pool size in 2004; the average
loan size in CMBS pools has grown from $5.4 million in 1997 to $11.0
million in 2004; and the property type makeup of the pools has
changed from heavily weighted toward multifamily mortgages to
domination by office and retail mortgages.
Additionally, several current market factors may contribute to
balloon risk in current CMBS investment tranches. Low commercial
mortgage interest rates (generally below 6.0%) and increases in
property values over the past decade (with little if any appreciation in
property income) imply a reasonable chance that interest rates will
rise or property values will fall when commercial mortgages issued
today mature in the coming decade, thus increasing the probability of
balloon risk. That said, balloon risk today on loans issued in the mid-to
late 1990s is likely to remain low as current low interest rates allow for
generous debt service coverage and lower loan-to-value ratios on
appreciated property values, permitting relatively easy refinancing.
Another potential contributor to balloon risk for current-vintage
CMBS pools is relatively low subordination levels. Pool subordination
levels have fallen dramatically in recent years, with subordination
rates for conduit fusion transactions cut in half across all tranche levels
since 1998 (see Exhibit 1).
Furthermore, the increasing number of interest only and
partially interest-only loans in new CMBS issues may also cause higher
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balloon risk. Before 2000, interest-only or partial interest-only CMBS
loans were virtually non-existent, but in the fourth quarter of2004,
50% of conduit CMBS loans were partial interest-only or full interestonly loans (see Exhibit 2).
While balloon risk in commercial mortgages may be a significant
contributor to the overall risk of investing in commercial mortgagebacked securities, to date little research has focused on its impact on
CMBS pricing. There are two primary reasons for the limited balloon
risk research. First, as discussed earlier, there are limited data on
balloon risk. Second, it is difficult to model term default risk and
balloon risk simultaneously and then measure the impact of these risks
on CMBS investment tranches under changing market conditions.
Our primary purpose is to investigate the impact of balloon risk
on the pricing of multiclass commercial mortgage-backed securities
investments.

CMBS Pricing Model
To determine the credit risk in CMBS investments, we apply a
commercial mortgage whole-loan pricing model to a CMBS framework.
Specifically, we complete a series of simulation analyses that measure
the balloon risk premiums of various CMBS tranches under changing
pool characteristics and market conditions, such as lower tranche
subordination levels, higher mortgage interest rates, and interest-only
loans.
Our CMBS valuation model has two separate stages. In the first
stage, a whole loan's cash flow stream is projected on the basis of
borrower default behavior. Then after the cash flow streams for the
individual whole mortgages are simulated, mortgage cash flows are
combined across all loans in the pool and allocated among the various
CMBS investment classes in the second stage.
To estimate the whole-loan cash flows, we use our model in Tu
and Eppli [2003], which has two key distinguishing features. First, it
considers two triggers when simulating borrowers' default decision: a
property cash flow trigger, and an asset value trigger. Second, it takes
into account the possibility of mortgage extension or balloon risk.1
These unique features of the model allow us to incorporate balloon risk
into a CMBS framework and then assess its impact on various
investment tranches. Appendix A describes the double-trigger default
model in more detail.
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In the second stage, individual mortgage cash flow streams are
combined across all loans in the pool and allocated among the CMBS
investment classes. The value of each CMBS tranche is then calculated
as the present value of the cash flow stream on a risk-neutral basis.
To complete the two-stage analysis, we use Monte Carlo
simulation to derive the values and credit risk premiums for each
CMBS tranche.2 Each simulation path has three state variables
(interest rate, property value, and property cash flow) that are
updated each month (see Appendix B). Using the monthly updated
variables, the borrower makes a default decision based on the
contemporaneous loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt service coverage
ratio (DSC).3
If default occurs, the loan is foreclosed and the property is sold.
The sale price, net of transaction costs, is then included in the CMBS
pooled cash flows. If default does not occur, the scheduled mortgage
payment is made, and the default decision is considered for the next
period under a set of updated state variables.
If a borrower does not default during the loan term, we then
examine whether the property can be refinanced at mortgage
maturity. Using the contemporaneous property value, mortgage
interest rate, property cash flow, and underwriting standards, we
estimate the loan amount the borrower is able to refinance (i.e., the
justified refinance loan amount). If the justified refinance loan amount
is equal to or greater than the outstanding mortgage balance, the
mortgage balloon amount is paid off; otherwise, one of three paths is
followed: 1) the borrower will use other equity capital to pay off the
loan; 2) the borrower will default; or 3) the borrower and the lender
will negotiate an extension.
If the loan is extended, we assume the borrower will continue to
make periodic debt service payments and follow the same
payment/default conditions during the term of the loan. At the end of
each extended month, the mortgage may be paid off (if the justified
refinance loan amount exceeds the loan balance); in default (if both
default triggers are satisfied); or extended again (otherwise) based on
the new market and property conditions. Additionally, it is assumed
that the mortgage can be extended for up to two years, at which point
the borrower will be forced to liquidate the property and terminate the
mortgage if neither default nor payoff has occurred during the twoyear extension period.4
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After the cash flow streams for the 50% N mortgages in the
CMBS pool are simulated, the cash flows are combined and allocated
among CMBS investment classes. While interest payments and
principal repayments (including scheduled amortization and principal
recovery when default occurs) are distributed top-down to CMBS
tranches, lost interest and the reduction in face amount of the
principal (due to the shortfall between loan balance and principal
recovery) are allocated bottom-up.
The cash flow for each CMBS tranche is calculated monthly, and
the cash flow stream is discounted on a risk neutral basis to determine
each tranche value. The credit risk premium of a CMBS tranche over
the risk-free rate is then calculated based on the tranche value.

Simulation Parameters
We must now populate the CMBS pricing model with a set of
parameters that reflect the behavior of the market participants. We
consult a variety of academic journals, professional publications, and
industry experts to select a set of reasonable and logical parameters.
We begin the model parameterization by considering a CMBS
pool consisting of10-year commercial mortgages with a 30-year
amortization schedule. To isolate the impact of credit risk on mortgage
pricing, we assume that the mortgages are non-callable.5 The two
primary mortgage underwriting standards at loan origination and at
loan refinancing are a 67% LTV and a 1.4 DSC.
Most commercial mortgage underwriters require some level of
cash reserves or escrows to dampen cash flow volatility created by
capital improvements, tenant improvements, and other expected and
unexpected cash flow variances.6 When a property's contemporaneous
debt service coverage ratio slips below 1.0, the borrower can then
avoid immediate default by funding the property cash flow shortfall
with funds from a reserve account. We have no empirical data on how
long a borrower is able to delay default through the use of a reserve
account, so we present three models in the simulation analysis to
illustrate the effects of including the cash flow default trigger on CMBS
pricing.
Model 1 is a single-trigger, asset value-only, default model. The
other two models assume that the borrower has sufficient reserves to
fund a one-month (Model 2) and three-month (Model 3) cumulative
debt service shortfall in the previous 12-month period, where a oneJournal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September 2005): pg. 114-123. DOI. This article is © Institutional
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month shortfall is equal to one month's debt service payment. Models
2 and 3 are double-trigger default models that include a
contemporaneous LTV trigger and a contemporaneous cash flow
trigger that both must be met for the property to be in default.
Once a property is in default, it is assumed that the average
time to foreclosure is 12 months and that the property value recovery
rate is 90% with a standard deviation of 5%, consistent with the
commercial mortgage default update in Esaki and Goldman [2004].
Additionally, there is a carrying cost per month of0.5% of the loan
balance. These foreclosure assumptions hold for both term default and
extension default. For each parameterization, 10,000 Monte Carlo
paths are generated to ensure sufficient convergence to the true
tranche value.
CMBS Pricing Results-Base Case
In the base case analysis, CMBS subordination levels are
averages for the 1998-2004 period.7 To isolate the impact of balloon
risk on overall credit risk, we begin by presenting credit risk premiums
without including the effects of loan extension in Exhibit 3. At the
whole-loan level, the term default risk premiums are 81 basis points
for the single-default trigger model (i.e., Model 1). Including a cash
flow trigger in Models 2 and 3 reduces the risk premiums to 79 and 64
basis points, respectively.
An interesting finding in Exhibit 3 is that the addition of a
property income default trigger reduces whole loan default risk
premiums while increasing the default risk premium for the
investment-grade tranches. Initially these results seem counterintuitive, i.e., that a whole loan with lower risk premiums has higher
risk premiums for the investment-grade tranches. Yet after a closer
look, these findings are reasonable and can be explained as follows.
Under the Model 3 assumptions, weaker or underperforming
loans are kept current using a cash flow reserve account, and without
that reserve would otherwise have defaulted. By stringing along these
weaker loans, the eventual default, when it does occur, has a
significantly higher loss rate.8
While the probability or frequency of default at the whole-loan
level is reduced in Model 3 (as the financial condition of some of the
properties will improve), the increase in loss severity for the loans that
default increases the risk of the investment-grade tranches. The nonJournal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September 2005): pg. 114-123. DOI. This article is © Institutional
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investment-grade tranches, on the other hand, maintain tranche cash
flows longer in Model 3, thus reducing the risk of investing in lowerrated tranches.
Overall, adding a second property cash flow trigger reduces loss
frequency but increases loss severity at the whole-loan level. This shift
from lower loss frequency to greater loss severity at the whole-loan
level shifts the default risk in CMBS securities from the lower-rated
tranches to the higher-rated tranches.9
In Exhibit 4 we isolate the impact of balloon risk on the pricing
of CMBS investments. Panel A presents total credit risk premiums
(combined term default and balloon risk premiums) for CMBS tranches
across the three default models, and Panel B presents the balloon risk
premiums. The results reveal that the increase in whole-loan risk
premiums is only 3 to 7 basis points when balloon risk is considered.
Of the three models presented in Panel B, Model 3 has the highest
balloon risk premiums. The higher balloon risk premiums for Model 3
are expected, as weaker loans are able to make it to maturity without
defaulting but at maturity are forced to extend as they are too weak to
be refinanced.
When we assess balloon risk premiums at the tranche level, the
Model 3 balloon risk premiums are highest across all investment
tranches except for the AAA tranche, which does not incur any credit
risk premium across the three models. These results are important, as
what is thought to be safer underwriting procedures (i.e., increasing
property escrows) reduces default frequency, but increases loss
severity and balloon risk premiums across all investment tranches.
Furthermore, with a relatively small 7 basis-point increase in the
whole-loan credit risk premium that is attributable to balloon risk, total
risk premiums for the A, BBB, BB, and B tranches increase by 13 to 84
basis points.
Overall, we find that adding a second property income default
trigger and including balloon risk marginally affects the pricing of
whole loans but significantly affects the pricing of investment-grade
CMBS tranches.

CMBS Pricing Results—Comparative Analyses
To better understand the impact of balloon risk on CMBS
pricing, we also change the simulation parameters to reflect
alternative states of the property and capital markets. Specifically, we
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assess the effects on total credit risk and balloon risk of: 1) lower
subordination levels; 2) rising mortgage interest rates; and 3)
replacing amortizing loans with interest-only loans.
In these comparative analyses we focus on Model 3 simulation
results, assuming that rational borrowers would default only when the
property equity position and property cash flow are both negative and
when a debt service reserve account is depleted appears reasonable.10
The base case credit risk analysis presented in Exhibit 4
presumes average subordination levels for the period 1998-2004. Over
this period of time, however, the subordination levels of CMES
tranches have fallen substantially. The 2004 subordination levels are
approximately one-half the 1998 levels and as of this writing are at alltime lows (see Exhibit 1 for subordination levels in 1998, 2001, and
2004).
In Exhibit 5 we examine the impact of balloon risk on the pricing
of CMBS tranches using 2004 subordination levels. Whole-loan credit
risk premiums in Exhibits 4 and 5 are identical, as the CMES structure
does not affect the characteristics of individual loans. That said,
tranche credit risk premiums change dramatically. Total credit risk
premiums extend well into the AA tranche, increasing from 16 to 81
basis points.
While the balloon risk premiums relative to the total credit risk
premiums maintain approximately the same relationship (20%-25% of
the total risk is balloon risk in the investment-grade tranches, and
10%-15% of the total risk is balloon risk for non-investment-grade
tranches), balloon risk premiums become two to five times higher for
the AA, A, and BBB tranches than in the base case in Exhibit 4. As
expected, the results show that lower subordination levels shift credit
risk from lower-grade tranches to mid-level investment-grade
tranches.
In the next comparative analysis we simulate the impact of an
upward sloping yield curve on CMES credit risk premiums. With
interest rates at or near historically low levels, it is important to
understand how rising interest rates might affect the valuation of
CMBS tranches. The simulation results presented in Exhibit 6 employ a
moderately upward-sloping (100 basis point increase from a two-year
to a ten-year U.S. Treasury security) and a steeply upward-sloping
yield curve (200 basis point increase from a two-year to a ten-year
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U.S. Treasury security), which suggests higher interest rates in the
future.
The impact of rising interest rates on whole-loan risk premiums
is modest and attributable mainly to higher balloon risk. Yet changes
in CMBS risk premiums are dramatic, especially for a steeply upwardsloping yield curve (Panel B in Exhibit 6). Investment-grade tranche
total and balloon risk premiums (not including the AAA) almost double,
while the impact on the non-investment-grade tranches of a steeply
upward-sloping yield curve is more muted. Here again, the effect on
total credit risk and balloon risk of higher interest rates in the future
most significantly impacts the mid-range investment-grade tranches
and does not as strongly impact the BB and B investment tranches.
Interpreting the impact of interest-only loans on CMBS credit risk
premiums is complicated. At the whole-loan level, as amortization
reduces the loan balance over time, the possibility of default is
reduced if LTV is the only default trigger. When property cash flow is
also taken into account, interest-only loans may have lower default
risk due to the higher initial DSC (note that at origination we use the
same LTV for both amortizing and interest-only loans, so that the LTV
is likely to limit the loan size and not the DSC).
In our simulation analyses, commercial mortgages with a
30year amortization schedule (the base case) have an initial DSC ratio
of 1.40, while an interest-only loan with the same LTV has an initial
DSC of 1.58. As a result, a mortgage pricing model that ignores the
cash flow default condition likely overstates the probability of term
default.
While including the cash flow default trigger reduces the
probability or the frequency of term default, loss severity increases
dramatically for interest-only mortgages. The combination of lower
default frequency and higher loss severity shifts part of the default risk
from the lowest-rated subordinate tranches to investment-grade
tranches, as lower-rated tranches maintain a positive cash flow from
the investment for a longer period.
In Exhibit 7, the simulation results reveal that term default risk
premiums for non-investment-grade tranches either decline or stay the
same; the risk premiums on all investment-grade tranches increase.
As the term default probability declines, it becomes more likely
that a loan reaching maturity will not meet contemporaneous
refinancing requirements due to significantly weaker property or space
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market fundamentals. As a result, the whole-loan balloon risk
premiums rise, and the higher risk affects the investment-grade CMBS
tranches disproportionately. Here again, term default frequency is
reduced, while term default and balloon loss severity is increased.11

Conclusion
Using a contingent claims commercial mortgage pricing model in
a multi tranche CMBS framework, we attempt to quantify the impact of
balloon risk on CMBS investments. In the first stage of a two-stage
analysis, we use a double-trigger default model (a property cash flow
trigger and an asset value trigger) to project whole-loan cash flows. In
the second stage, the whole-loan cash flows are pooled and allocated
to the various CMBS tranches. The value and risk premiums of each
tranche are then calculated using Monte Carlo simulation.
We also complete a series of analyses under changing pool
characteristics and market conditions, including lower subordination
levels, interest-only loans, and higher mortgage interest rates.
There are two significant findings in this research. First, balloon
risk constitutes a relatively small portion of total credit risk at the
whole-loan level (less than 10% of the total credit risk premium is
attributable to balloon risk).Second, while balloon credit risk premiums
are low at the whole-loan level (3-7 basis points), this risk
disproportionately and significantly impacts all but the highest-rated
investment-grade CMBS tranches.
Balloon risk becomes a significant portion of the total credit risk
premium for most investment-grade CMBS tranches, especially when
more restrictive cash flow default triggers (such as higher property
escrows) reduce the frequency of term default. As cash flow reserves
prevent weaker properties from defaulting during the term of the loan,
these properties become more vulnerable to balloon risk at maturity.
The increase in loss severity from stringing along weak properties
creeps into the pricing of the investment-grade tranches. Conversely,
as non-investment grade CMBS tranches are kept in the deal with
lower term default frequency, they receive interest payments longer in
the face of deteriorating property fundamentals, and thus benefit from
the reduction in loss frequency.
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Appendix A: A Double-Trigger Default Model for Commercial
Mortgages
Most mortgage pricing studies assume monolithic default, i.e., the
borrower defaults when the property value falls below the mortgage
value. These default models have two major drawbacks. First, they
ignore the borrower's cash flow position (i.e., a borrower would default
even if the property net cash flow is sufficient to cover debt service).
Second, they do not take into account default costs that are
heterogeneous across borrowers.
To address these issues, we develop a double-trigger mortgage
pricing model by modifying the Riddiough-Thompson [1993] fuzzy
boundary default function and adding a cash flow default trigger.
Riddiough and Thompson [1993] introduce a commercial
mortgage pricing model that endogenizes the effects of borrower
default costs. The model's probability of default is a function of time to
maturity and net equity in the property (illustrated in Exhibit A, where
the net equity level is the ratio of property value over mortgage
value).
The plot shows that the borrower is more likely to default when
the net equity level is lower and/or the loan approaches maturity. For
various reasons, including borrower reputation concerns and tax
liability effects, however, a negative equity position does not always
trigger default.
In our model, the borrower must incur a negative cash flow
position in addition to an adverse net equity level to trigger default.
Furthermore, a borrower is unlikely to default immediately when the
DSC drops below 1.0. The borrower may fund a debt service shortfall
through a property reserve account or other equity sources. Even
when the borrower fails to make the payment, the master servicer
advances the principal and interest payments if the shortfall is deemed
temporary.
As a result, in the whole-loan pricing model, we assume that the
borrower will default only when the net equity level is below one and
the cumulative cash flow shortfall over a 12-month period exceeds a
certain threshold (for example, one month or three months' debt
service).
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Appendix B: State Variables in the Default Model
Three state variables are specified in the contingent claims model:
interest rate, property value, and payout rate. Interest rate variations
are assumed to follow the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross [1985] meanrevertingprocess:12

dr = κ(θ- r)dt + σr√͞rdzr (B-1)
where κ is the speed of reversion parameter, θ is the long-term
reversion rate, σr√͞r is the standard deviation of changes in the current
spot rate, and dzr is a standard Wiener process. A variety of shapes of
the yield curve can be described by using a different initial interest
rate, r0·.
Property values are assumed to follow a lognormal diffusion
process:

dΡ = (αΡ - βΡ )Ρdt + σρΡdzρ (B-2)
where Ρ is the property price, αΡ is the expected total return on the
property, βΡ is the continuous property income payout rate, σρ is a
volatility parameter of property returns, and dzρ is a standard Wiener
process. To estimate the credit risk premium of commercial mortgages
we apply the risk-neutral valuation principle, where the risk-neutral
property price process is specified as:

dΡ = (r - βΡ) Ρdt + σρΡdzρ (B-3)
and r is the riskless spot rate. It is assumed that there is an
instantaneous correlation between changes in property prices and
interest rates,

ρΡr.

The third stochastic variable in the mortgage pricing model is
property cash flow. Monthly property cash flow is determined by
multiplying the property value by the property income payout rate,
which is modeled as a function of contemporaneous market interest
rates. Since interest rate and payout rate are correlated, we specify
the payout rate as a linear function of interest rates plus a random
volatility measure:13

βΡ = α + b x r + ε

(B-4)
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where βΡ is the property income payout rate, r is the interest rate, α
and b are estimated parameters, and ε is the residual. It is also
assumed there is an autocorrelation term ρε between εt and εt-1.
Endnotes
The insights and comments of Martha Peyton and David Jacob
have significantly improved this research. The Real Estate Research
Institute (RERI) provided financial support to complete this paper. The
authors thank them all.
1. Most commercial mortgage pricing models in the academic literature use
asset value as the sole default trigger, assuming that a borrower
would default if and only if the property value is below the mortgage
value (examples are Titman and Torous [1989], Kau et al. [1990],
Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996], and Ciochetti and Yandell [1999]).
Rational borrowers, however, would not default during the term of the
loan if the property is generating sufficient cash flow to cover the debt
service, even when the equity is negative. Therefore, adding a cash
flow trigger as a necessary default condition that more accurately
reflects borrower behavior. Jacob, Hong, and Lee [1999] consider
property NOI as a default trigger, but they do not address balloon risk.
Most pricing models also assume that the balloon balance is
immediately paid off at maturity if default conditions are not met,
ignoring the possibility that the borrower might not be able to pay off
the mortgage in full.
2. The backward numeric approach is preferred by many academic
researchers as it explicitly measures the value of embedded default
options in a mortgage. We use the Monte Carlo simulation approach
for three primary reasons. First, we consider a double-trigger
mortgage default model (i.e., one that considers both asset value and
cash flow as default triggers), where three state variables are used to
price a single mortgage: property cash flows, mortgage interest rates,
and property values. When the model is applied to value a mortgage
pool with N loans, (2N + 1) state variables are incorporated. This type
of valuation problem becomes intractable using a backward numerical
method, as computation time increases exponentially with the number
of state variables. Monte Carlo simulation permits the use of a large
number of state variables and provides more flexibility to reflect
changing market conditions.
A second general criticism of mortgage and CMBS pricing
models is their inability to capture real estate cycles and differences
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across markets and property types (see Hudson- Wilson and
Pappadopoulos [1999]). We find this a valid criticism and have
incorporated these factors into the stochastic property valuation
process and the income correlation between individual properties.
The third limitation is that the backward numeric method
requires the specification of terminal conditions at maturity, and then
works backward in time to derive the mortgage value. If we take into
account the possibility of loan extension, terminal conditions cannot be
specified at the originally scheduled maturity. As a result, the forwardlooking Monte Carlo approach provides the only reasonable means of
valuing multitranche CMBS using a double-trigger term default and
balloon risk model.
3. In the double-trigger default model, the borrower must incur a negative
cash flow position and a negative net equity level to consider default.
In other words, a DSC of less than and an LTV of higher than 1.0 are
both necessary conditions for default.
4. While a range of mortgage extension fees and rules can be imposed that
vary widely among the different mortgage loan agreements, our
extension parameters are reflective of what many special servicers
impose on mortgage loans that are extended beyond the mortgage
maturity date (see Jacob and Fastovsky [1999]).
5. Commercial mortgage pricing studies have generally presumed noncallable mortgages (see Titman and Torous [1989], Riddiough and
Thompson [1993], and Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996]). Most
commercial mortgages have lockout periods and strict prepayment
penalties in the form of defeasance and yield maintenance prepayment
penalties.
Parameters related to the stochastic processes of the three
state variables include: a flat yield curve (r0 = 7.5%, κ = 25%, θ =
7.5%, and σr= 8.0%), a property return volatility of 15%, a zero
correlation between property value and interest rate, and an initial
property payout rate of 7.8%. These assumptions are consistent with
Esaki, L'Heureux, and Snyderman [1999] and Esaki and Goldman
[2004].
6. For example, see the "Fitch Commercial Mortgage Presale Report" [2003].
Its summary statistics reveal that 82% of all mortgages in the pool
have capital reserve requirements and 87% have upfront or ongoing
expense reserve requirements.
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7. CMBS subordination levels have fallen dramatically over the 1998-2004
period. As 2004 subordination levels were at all-time lows, we feel an
average subordination level over a relevant analysis period may be
more reflective of the market and allow us to later test the impact of
changing subordination levels on the pricing of CMBS investment
tranches.
8. Jacob and Fastovsky [1999] reveal similar findings for trouble loans that
are modified.
9. Interest-only strips (IOs) in CMBS are often assigned AAA ratings. The
unique characteristics of this type of investment make it inappropriate
to consider the credit risk of an 10 equivalent to that of an AAA-rated
CMBS investment tranche. We focus on the impact of balloon risk on
bond classes with non-notional principal balances.
10. For example, with a 6.50% mortgage constant, the cost of keeping the
option open is 1.625% of the loan amount at origination in the threemonth reserve scenario.
11. We have completed additional simulation analyses; examples include
changing underwriting standards at the time of refinancing, using
different cash flow payout rates, and changing the borrower's ability to
self-fund the balloon payment shortfall. In all cases where balloon risk
increases at the whole-loan level, investment-grade CMBS tranches
are disproportionately affected. The patterns are consistent with those
scenarios presented in the comparative analyses section; investors in
mid-level investment-grade tranches bear most of the increase in
balloon risk.
12. Levin [2004, p. 77] compares term structure models and finds that "any
volatility model between the normal one and the square root seems to
be a decent choice." An example of the square root models, the CoxIngersoll-Ross model is the most commonly used in the mortgage
pricing literature.
13. Data on commercial property income payout rates are not available, so
we estimate the relationship between payout rates and interest rates
using property capitalization rates as a proxy. A regression of
capitalization rates on mortgage contract rates is estimated using ACLI
data. A similar approach is taken by Goldberg and Capone [2002].
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Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Subordination Levels of CMBS Tranches
Image unavailable due to third-party copyright restrictions. Please see
definitive published version to view image:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2005.593894
Exhibit 2: Interest-Only Loans in Conduit CMBS
Image unavailable due to third-party copyright restrictions. Please see
definitive published version to view image:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2005.593894
Exhibit 3: Term Default Risk Premiums of CMBS Tranches (in basis
points)*
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Exhibit 4: Credit Risk Premiums of CMBS Tranches (including balloon
risk)—Base Case

Exhibit 5: Impact of Lower Subordination Levels on CMBS Tranches
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Exhibit 6: Impact of Different Shapes of Yield Curve on CMBS
Tranches
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Exhibit 7: Impact of Interest-Only Loans on CMBS Tranches

Exhibit A: Default Probability Functions
Image unavailable due to third-party copyright restrictions. Please see
definitive published version to view image:
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